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Legal Medievalism in Lex Mercatoria Scholarship
Ralf Michaels*
[L]ong life to the Middle Ages and to the dreaming of them, provided
that it is not the dream of reason. We have already generated too
many monsters.1
Emily Kadens has written a fabulous paper—broad in its scope,
meticulous in its research, provocative in its main theses, and convincing in
its analysis.2 She writes to disprove a myth that is told and retold, especially
by proponents of a new lex mercatoria—the myth of a uniform customary
law merchant in the middle ages. Such disproof is as difficult as the proof
of any negative; Charles Donahue aptly called it a probatio diabolica.3 She
succeeds admirably, and I have neither ground nor competence to challenge
her historical findings.4

* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International & Comparative Law, Duke
University School of Law. I am grateful to Emily Kadens for her gracious comments.
1. Umberto Eco, ‘Dreaming of the Middle Ages: An Unpublished Fragment,’ 63 SEMIOTICA
239, 239 (1987). I borrow the quote from Helge Dedek, The Splendour of Form: Scholastic
Jurisprudence and “Irrational Formality,” 5 LAW & HUMANITIES 349, 349 (2011).
2. Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1153 (2012).
3 . Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the
Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 27 (2004).
4. I have one small quarrel, however. Much of Kadens’s argument rests on a definition of
custom, borrowed from Bartolus, as sharply distinct from contract. Kadens, supra note 2, at 1163–
67. This is not the only available definition for custom, however, and it is not necessarily the one
used by modern proponents of lex mercatoria. Kadens justifies her choice with two arguments:
first, Bartolus’s definition was widely accepted in the Middle Ages and may have been known even
to the medieval merchants; second, the definition allows us to distinguish between custom and
contract. Id. at 1166. Both justifications are doubtful.
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Instead, I am interested in whether the story can be disproved through
historial analysis at all. After all, although Kadens’s is certainly the most
comprehensive historical study refuting a medieval universal customary lex
mercatoria, it is not at all the first one, as she readily acknowledges.5 In
fact, it appears that legal historians have agreed for some time now on
Kadens’s main finding, namely that depictions of a universal customary
medieval lex mercatoria are historically inaccurate.6 And yet, proponents of
As to the latter point, whether custom and contract are really distinct is an open question,
both in legal theory and in the lex mercatoria discussion, and Kadens’s opponents may simply reply
that their concept is different. Bruce Benson, for example, explicitly invokes Lon Fuller’s idea of
custom as interaction, which creates a continuum between custom and contract. Bruce L. Benson,
The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 645 (1989). See also Bruce L.
Benson, Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law, 3 CONST. POL.
ECON. 1, 2 (1992); LON L. FULLER, THE ANATOMY OF LAW (1968); Lon L. Fuller, Human
Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 13–20 (1969), reprinted in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L FULLER 231, 243–50 (Kenneth Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001);
Ralf Michaels, A Fuller Concept of Law Beyond the State?: Thoughts on Lon Fuller’s Contributions
to the Jurisprudence of Transnational Dispute Resolution—A Reply to Thomas Schultz, 2 J. INT’L
DISP. RESOL. 417, 421–2 (2011); Gerald J Postema, Implicit Law 13 LAW & PHIL. 361, 362 (1994).
Gunther Teubner, in his influential theory of the new lex mercatoria, elaborates on the relation
between individual contracts and contract in general as the source of a lex mercatoria. See
generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (1997) (discussing the paradox of self-validating contracts in the context
of global law). In other words, although it may be useful, for analytical purposes, to distinguish
custom from contract, it is not clear that the theory of a customary medieval lex mercatoria can be
refuted merely with a redefined concept of custom.
As to Kadens’s first point, I cannot see why we should not be allowed to describe what
medieval merchants did as customs even if they themselves would not have done so. All that this
requires is our awareness that that we are just using a different concept. From an observer’s
perspective, there is nothing anachronistic in using analytic descriptive terms for historical events.
This must be true especially for those authors who seek lessons from the Middle Ages for our time,
because they need to use concepts that transcend different times and cultures. (Whether then the
historical phenomenon is in fact captured by the concept is, of course, an entirely different
question.)
This point is not at all fatal to Kadens’s argument, which remains, in my view, fully
successful.
5. Kadens, supra note 2, at 1156.
6. For sources in English, see Kadens, supra note 2 at 1157 n.6. Numerous other sources also
support this proposition. E.g., Jean Bart, La Lex Mercatoria au Moyen-Age: mythe ou réalité?, in
SOUVERAINETÉ ÉTATIQUE ET MARCHÉS INTERNATIONAUX À LA FIN DU XXE SIÈCLE—MÉLANGES
EN HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE KAHN 18 (2000); Kent D. Lerch, Vom Kerbholz zur Konzernbilanz?:
Wege und Holzwege zu Einem Autonomen Recht der Global Economy, 5 Rechtsgeschichte 107
(2004); Karl Otto Scherner, Lex Mercatoria—Realität, Geschichtsbild oder Vision?, 118
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE—GERMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG 148 (2001). See also
SHEILAGH OGILVIE, INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN TRADE: MERCHANT GUILDS, 1000–1800, at
250 (2011); Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie, What Lessons for Economic Development Can
We Draw from the Champagne Fairs?, EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. (forthcoming 2012). Similar
arguments have recently been made against the idea of an autonomous legal order amongst
Maghribi traders, voiced most prominently by Anver Greif. See Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh
Ogilvie, Contract Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders
Reappraised, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 421 (2012) (arguing against the existence of an “exclusive
coalition” of Maghribi traders with “defined membership” that used ostracism as a substitute for
contract enforcement). But see Avner Greif, The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal?, 65 ECON.
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a new lex mercatoria have been resilient and continue to tell stories of
exactly such a law.7
How can proponents simply ignore these findings? Kadens speculates
that “[t]he story simply holds too much symbolic power for modern
advocates of private ordering looking to give the underpinning of historical
legitimacy to their political and economic theories about how law is and
should be made.”8 This seems plausible. But it begs the question as to why
a modern lex mercatoria would require historical legitimacy in the first
place. And it leaves open wherein the symbolic power actually consists, and
why it seems so robust towards historical evidence to the contrary. These
are the questions I want to address here.
I.

A Curious Historiography

Kadens is right: proponents of a new law merchant claim, almost
universally and often unsubstantiatedly, that a customary and universal lex
mercatoria existed in the middle ages. The story is always mostly identical,
often down to the details: just the level of detail is different.
In many texts, the historical antecedents are mentioned in one or a few
sentences, without providing any evidence for the claim. 9 This is so even in
works that otherwise use lots of evidence elsewhere for claims made on
modern lex mercatoria.10 These other texts contain often relatively lengthy
accounts, but the evidence is used only selectively.11 Often, the only authors
cited for the historial evidence are not historians, but are other writers on
modern lex mercatoria.12 Where historical sources are used, they are almost
always the same old sources—which does not keep authors from presenting
HIST. REV. 445 (2012), (maintaining his assertion that a “multilateral reputational mechanism was
particularly important” to Maghribi traders).
7. See Kadens, supra note 2, at 1156 n.5.
8. Id. at 1157.
9. E.g., H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A
Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretative Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 276 (2011);
Isaac DiIanni, The Role of Competition in the Market for Adjudication, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
203, 227 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as
a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union,
63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 502 (2011).
10. E.g., DiIanni, supra note 9, at 227–29 (providing a very thinly sourced discussion of the
“medieval Law Merchant” before discussing a modern version in the diamond industry in detail);
Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 33–34 (1991) (providing again a thinly sourced and conclusory
history of lex mercatoria in the context of an article arguing to extend the principles to current
international commercial arbitration cases). But see Blair, supra note 9, at 276 & n.28 (directing
the reader to a number of sources for a more detailed history of lex mercatoria).
11. E.g. Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 627, 629–30 (2006) (citing only two sources to support several pages of discussion of
medieval lex mercatoria).
12. See, e.g., Byran Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and
Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 161–62 & n.116 (2009).
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their view, with surprising conviction, as irrefutable truth. 13 Sometimes
even the skeptics are cited side by side with proponents as though there were
no difference.14
And even when the skepticism is acknowledged, this is often done in a
curious manner. Chris Drazohal, for example, lists some critics in a
footnote (without mentioning their criticism in the text) but then concludes,
disarmingly, that he “take[s] no position on this historical debate.”15 History
seems to matter, but the realities of the past do not. Leon Trakman, once
seemingly one of the most ardent proponents, takes a yet more surprising
approach. In the introduction for a recent important article, he mentions the
“skeptical accounts,”16 and indeed much of his ensuing article is devoted to
lessons from the skeptical history, on both the claim that lex mercatoria was
universal and the one that it was autonomous.17 But it is not clear to what
extent the skeptics actually made him change his views. Kadens may view
Trakman as emblematic of the position she criticizes;18 Trakman in turn cites
his earlier work as fully in line with hers and with that of other critics.19
II.

Lex Mercatoria as Myth and as Thought Experiment

Why do proponents of a new lex mercatoria refer so regularly to a
medieval antecedent? And why do they present that antecedent with such
little care for the research by historians? The latter question may be easier
to answer: proponents of a new law merchant are commercial lawyers,
comparative lawyers, libertarian economists, institutionalists, but not
historians.20 Therefore, they have little competence or desire to engage in

13. The crassest example of which I am aware is Peter T. Leeson, One More Time with Feeling:
The Law Merchant, Arbitration, and International Trade, INDIAN J. ECON. & BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
29 (2007). Remarkably, Leeson reports on his presence at a Chicago conference where Kadens
first presented her ideas. See id. at 33–34 (referring to the conference including Kadens’s
presentation of Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the Medieval
Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39). Her argument must not have left much of an impression on
Leeson.
14. See, e.g., DAVID B. GOLDMAN, GLOBALISATION AND THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION:
RECURRING PATTERNS OF LAW AND AUTHORITY 276 n.13 (2007) (citing lex mercatoria proponent
Harold J. Berman alongside the more skeptical Albrecht Cordes); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The
Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial
Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 657, 658 n.2 (1999) (citing lex mercatoria proponent Leon
E. Trakman alongside skeptic J.H. Baker).
15. Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1038 n.32 (2009). A footnote similarly unconnected to the main text is in
Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 KAN. L. REV. 663, 672 n.52 (2008).
16. Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 776 n.2
(2011).
17. Id. at 782–98.
18. Kadens, supra note 2, at 1168–70 n.45.
19. Trakman, supra note 16, at 776 n.4.
20. E.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place—A 21st
Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1–22
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detailed primary research, or even broad surveys of the existing scholarly
literature—especially if the few sources they do know already match their
own theories and ideologies.21 The insufficient reception of newer findings
merely represents a general problem of interdisciplinary communication—
one that legal historians in particular have deplored in other areas, too.22
This may explain why nonhistorians get the history wrong, but not why
they care so much about the history in the first place. In light of this,
Kadens’s suggestion that modern theories require “historical legitimacy”
must be at least incomplete. 23 True, the reference to the medieval
antecedents of a new law merchant must evidently be considered relevant, or
it would not be omnipresent. Indeed, some claim that the medieval story
holds direct lessons for the present.24
But how can a false view of the Middle Ages hold lessons? It seems
that, as Nikitas Hatzimihail has put it, “what matters, for the debate, is not so
much what actually happened, but what projections into the past align best
with present circumstances and what constructions of the past are used to
justify explanations of the present.”25 Steve Sachs shows how such political
use of concepts of lex mercatoria concept is not an invention of the twentieth
century, but has existed since the fifteenth century: it can be found in the
jurisdictional contests over mercantile cases between English courts, in the
struggle between Romanists and Germanists in nineteenth-century Germany,
and in consequence of this in twentieth-century visions in common-law
countries. 26 I am convinced that this is correct. But it still begs the

(2001) (comparative lawyer); Michael T. Medwig, The New Law Merchant: Legal Rhetoric and
Commercial Reality, 24 L. & POL. IN INT’L BUS. 589 (a commercial lawyer). And Kadens
describes proponents Benson and Trackman as “libertarian and legal economic theorists.” Kadens,
supra note 2, at 1168.
21. Nicholas H.D. Foster, Foundation Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law Merchant
and the New Lex Mercatoria, 2005 FORUM HISTORIAE JURIS, available at
http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0503foster.htm (arguing that the commercial lawyers’ misguided
support of new lex mercatoria derives from the fact that “few, in any, are legal historians,” and it is
“ideologically convenient” for them to hold this view).
22. See generally Laura F. Edwards, The History in “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 187 (2012) (criticizing current uses of legal history).
23. Kadens, supra note 2, at 1157. See generally Joanna Jemielniak, Legitimization Arguments
in the Lex Mercatoria Cases, 18 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 175 (2005).
24. See, e.g., LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL
LAW 17 (1983) (claiming that lex mercatoria’s relevance stems from the “anthropological
perspective” it provides as well as its potential usefulness as a “model for innovation”); Franz
Wieacker, Historische Voraussetzungen supranationaler Privatrechtsordnungen, in FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 575, 576, 585–88 (Herbert Bernstein et al. eds., 1981).
25 . Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as
Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2008). This
may explain how Trakman finds confirmation for his position in Kadens’s and others’ work. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. Steven E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law
Merchant’, 21 AM.U. INT’L L. REV.685, 794-803 (2006). For a fuller historiography, see LEX
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question as to why a reference to history should play such a prominent role in
these projects.
Perhaps the most convincing answer has been given by Nicholas Foster.
He suggests that the medieval origins of the modern lex mercatoria serve as a
“foundation myth.”27 This explains, at the same time, the symbolic value of
the history and at the same time the irrelevance of its inaccuracy. When
proponents of a new lex mercatoria invoke the medieval lex mercatoria, they
do so not for actual empirical accuracy, but instead to lay out a common
ground. This mythical lex mercatoria is related to the actual medieval lex
mercatoria in the same way in which the mythical Charlemagne is related to
the historical emperor of the Franks, or the creation of the world in seven
days is to the big bang. Such foundation myths are not falsifiable by new
evidence because their truth lies not in empirics but in a common faith.
Seen like this, the historiography of mercantile law is not “a game of
‘Telephone,’ with one generation interpreting the works of previous authors
and the next interpreting the interpretations.”28 Instead, it is a rite in which
members of a group tell each other the same story again and again—or, in the
academic equivalent, cite one another to support this story. Malynes’
seventeenth-century definition of lex mercatoria as “a Customary Law
approued by the authoritie of all Kingdomes and Commonweales, and not a
Law eſtabliſhed by the Soueraigntie of any Prince”29 is repeated again and
again not because Malynes had any superior historial or even legal expertise
(he was a trader), but because the quote has become a mantra.30
A foundation myth smacks of irrationality, but there is a rational
counterpart: the medieval lex mercatoria as a thought experiment. To some
extent, that seems to be what libertarians have in mind when they invoke a
medieval lex mercatoria as a pure private governance. It is not intended as a
description of how things actually were, but an imagination of how things
could have been. This would be reminiscent of Richard Nozick’s rather
curious speculation on how states might have been formed in his Anarchy,
State, and Utopia.31 Others more openly invoke lex mercatoria as an idea

MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS
AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. eds., 1998).
27. See generally Foster, supra note 21. The idea can also be found in Gunther Teubner,
Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 152
(1997).
28. Sachs, supra note 26, at 806.
29 . GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA OR THE ANCIENT LAW–
MERCHANT (1622).
30 . See uses of the quote in M. S. Blackman, Mercantile Law and Mercantile Practice:
Mercantile Practice as a Reviving Source of Mercantile Law, 103 S. AFRICAN L.J. 209, 214 n.21
(1986); Noel Cox, The Regulation of Cyberspace and the Loss of National Sovereignty, 11 INFO. &
COMM. TECH. L. 241, 241 (2002); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial
Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 137 (1934).
31. RICHARD NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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rather than reality. 32 Here, the medieval lex mecatoria is not a myth but
neither is it a purported reality. Instead, it is a hypothetical history that is
nonetheless used as evidence.
III. Legal Medievalism
This leaves one question open: why is the medieval law merchant in
particular such a popular model? We should note that lex mercatoria is not
the only instance of a new development based on a comparison with the
Middle Ages. Rather, the idea fits the more general theory of a new
medievalism, as suggested some thirty-five years ago by Hedley Bull as an
image for the overlapping power structures of globalization.33 This idea has
been influential also in legal studies.34 The underlying idea is, presumably,
one of globalization: If we want to create a law for globalization after the
nation state, then we should look for models from the time before the nation
state—the Middle Ages in particular.
Now, the Middle Ages are, quite obviously, a rather inadequate model
for our time.35 Their politics, their societies, their spirituality, and of course
their laws, were so vastly different from ours that a direct comparison is
almost impossible; and Kadens’s article gives ample evidence of much of
this.36 Even the existence of overlapping power structures beyond the state,
the main reason for their renaissance in globalization studies, is only an
apparent similarity. 37 In the Middle Ages, such overlapping structures
existed outside the state simply because a state, in the modern sense, did not

32 . See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 31 (2010) (referring to lex
mercatoria as a romantic notion); Teubner, supra note 27, at 149–69 (mentioning that “lex
mercatoria, no doubt, is non-law,” but arguing that lex mercatoria will emerge as globalization
progresses); TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 15 (puzzling through the lex mercatoria “paradox”).
33. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 245–
6, 254–55 (1977). See also John Rapley, The New Middle Ages, 85 FOREIGN AFF. (2006)
(comparing “gang-controlled communities in Jamaica” to the “ad hoc arrangements” of tribes
during the Middle Ages).
34. E.g., David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance, 57
EMORY L.J. 201, 213–17 (2007).
35. See Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 523–4 (2006)
(arguing that “the neo-medievalist lens proves anachronistic” when used in the context of a global
society where nation-states, the global business community, and international arbitrators
“coexist[]”).
36. E.g., Kadens, supra note 2, at 1160 (explaining that, unlike merchants today, medieval
traders did business face-to-face and settled disagreements by invoking principles of equity rather
than by resorting to law).
37. Cf. Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 39
(arguing that, in presence of the state, non-state governance and state governance will necessarily
overlap, but that the systematic “distribution of labor” between the two reveals their dissimilarity).
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yet exist.38 This is quite different from a situation in which states exist, even
if they are not the only sources of authority (as though they ever had been).
In this sense, the Middle Ages can serve only as a metaphor, and this is
indeed how Bull uses them.39
Such use of the Middle Ages can have a promising critical potential.
This critical potential is aptly described by Ronald J. Deibert, following
Richard Rorty, as “therapeutic rediscription”: “The purpose, in other words,
would be to redescribe the present in novel terms in order to shake us free of
our current conceptual blinders that are holding us captive and getting in the
way.”40 Here, it is precisely the radical otherness of the Middle Ages that
makes them generative of new ideas and conceptualizations. And yet, alas,
this critical potential is not what most proponents of a new lex mercatoria are
after. True, proponents do want to challenge a paradigm that arguably holds
us captive, namely that of state centrism, or methodological nationalism.
But if, as is the case, the Middle Ages are not presented as radically different,
but as extremely similar to our time, the promise of the metaphor is lost.
What could be therapeutic rediscription instead becomes romantic nostalgia
for an imagined past.
This romantic nostalgia for an imagined past is what Umberto Eco has
described as neo-medievalism. 41 Eco’s idea is quite distinct from Hedley
Bull’s, even though both are sometimes named side by side. Where Bull’s
use of the Middle Ages is metaphorical,42 Eco’s neo-medievalism is openly
utopian.43 Eco descibes how our view of the Middle Ages has always been a
dream of a better world.44 Sometimes the Middle Ages are openly invoked
as a utopian dream with direct application for our world—a famous example
from the nineteenth century is William Morris’s socialist utopia “News from
Nowhere.” 45 Other times, the Middle Ages are presented as an escapist
dream.46

38. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia: 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L. L. 20, 26 (1948)
(acknowledging widespread recognition of the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, as the impetus
of the modern state and modern international law).
39. See BULL, supra note 33, at 254 (arguing that if globalization leads to the disappearance of
sovereign states, “a modern and secular equivalent to the kind of universal political organization
that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages” may emerge).
40. Ronald J. Deibert, ‘Exorcismus Theoriae’: Pragmatism, Metaphors and the Return of the
Medieval in IR Theory, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 167, 185 (1997).
41. UMBERTO ECO, Dreaming of the Middle Ages, in UMBERTO ECO, TRAVELS IN
HYPERREALITY 61 (1986).
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. Eco, supra note 1.
44. See id.
45. WILLIAM MORRIS, NEWS FROM NOWHERE (1891).
46. See generally ECO, supra note 41.
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The image of the medieval lex mercatoria is a dream as well 47 —so
much so that we can talk, in analogy to Eco, of legal (neo-)medievalism.48
By this I mean a reference to the middle ages not as a historical fact but
instead as a romantic idealized vision of the present. Historians may aim at
describing the actual middle ages to show how things actually were in the
past. Proponents of a new lex mercatoria, by contrast, aim at invoking
utopias of an imagined middle ages to show how things actually could and
should be in the present. And utopias cannot be falsified: after all, it is their
main characteristic that they are not true in this world.
IV. On the Historian’s Task
This has been a long argument. In the end, however, it may suggest
why critics like Kadens have been so unsuccessful at refuting the stories told
by proponents of a new lex mercatoria. Scholars of medieval law on the
one hand, and legal medievalists on the other, may appear to speak of the
same things. In reality, however, Kadens’s Middle Ages have little to do
with the Middle Ages of the new lex mercatoria proponents—not because
she knows history and they do not (although that is true, too), but because
she cares about actual facts and they care about a dream.
It may seem obvious that such an imaginary Middle Ages, and an
imaginary lex mercatoria, need to be rejected because of their ideological
potential.49 I am not fully convinced. It is worth pointing out that legal
positivism equally rests on mythical foundations,50 as does the ideal of the
state, on which so much current legal thinking rests.51 The problem is not, it
seems to me, dreaming per se. The problem begins, following the quote by
Eco with which I began this short comment, once these dreams are taken as
reason, and as direct models for our present problems.
Obviously, this does not at all mean that proponents of a new lex
mercatoria have nothing to learn from work like Kadens’s. If they rest their
arguments on an alleged reality of a medieval lex mercatoria, they must
account for how this real lex mercatoria looked. If they rest their argument
on an imagined medieval lex mercatoria, it would behoove them to say so

47. Ralf Michaels, Rollen und Rollenverständnisse im Transnationalen Privatrecht, 45
BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938441; Ralf Michaels, Address
to London School of Economics and Political Science: Dreaming Transnational Law—Dream,
Faith, Vision and Utopia in Current Legal Discourse (Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4-WByzfiEQ.
48. di Robilant, supra note 35, at 518.
49. Id. at 522–27.
50. See generally PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992). For a
modern application, see Ralf Michaels, Code vs. Code—Nationalist and Internationalist Images of
the Code Civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification, in EUR. REV. CONT. L.
(forthcoming 2012).
51. The classical exposition is ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1947).
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clearly, and to distinguish their own narratives from those told convincingly
by historians.
But it may imply that some of Kadens’s brilliance and erudition may be
ill-focused if she takes on arguments with the proponents of a new lex
mercatoria. Kadens writes, as far as I can tell, in the reputable (though not
today undisputed) tradition of Leopod von Ranke’s plea that historians
should describe wie es eigentlich gewesen—what actually happened (or,
perhaps more accurately, how things essentially were).52 This is not what
proponents of a new lex mercatoria are interested in. What they use is not
history, and historians should point out that it is not. As concerns history
itself, historians have worthier theorists amongst themselves than the legal
medievalists.

52 . See LEOPOLD VON RANKE, GESCHICHTEN DER ROMANISCHEN UND GERMANISCHEN
VÖLKER VON 1494 BIS 1535, at vi (1824). Kadens herself suggests: “I’m not a full-out Rankean. I
know I can’t know the es. Following the wise words of a college professor of mine, I don’t try to
be right. I try not to be wrong.” E-mail from Emily Kadens to author (Feb. 24, 2012, 08:56:49
EST) (on file with author).

